This article describes how the modern poultry industry emerged in Britain principally through initiatives from food retailers. It is this that distinguishes the British case from parallel developments in U.S., where there was also a great expansion in poultry production and consumption. As in the U.S., entrepreneurial poultry farmers collaborated with pharmaceutical and animal feeds companies, with food retailers and refrigeration unit manufacturers, and together they conducted a wholly novel experiment in the organisation of agriculture. But at the forefront of the emergence of modern poultry farming in the U.S. was the active and interventionist hand of government through the United States Department of Agriculture. In Britain the role of innovator and co-ordinator fell to a small group of entrepreneurial poultry farmers .
3 and a handful of highly innovative food retailers, with one, J. Sainsbury, leading the way.
I. The American Origins of the Broiler Chicken Industry
Chicken meat had long been eaten throughout most of the world, but never as a staple.
In the 1920s chicken was code for an enticing luxury in America, with Herbert
Hoover's 1928 electoral slogan, "A chicken in every pot" victoriously aimed at aspirational voters at the end of the Roaring Twenties. But it was there that the transition from occasional luxury to everyday staple occurred first.
Initially only one section of America's heterogeneous population saw chicken as a staple, America's Jews. New York City, with almost three-quarters of America's first and second generation immigrant Jews, was the largest Jewish city in the world. It represented the largest and most concentrated urban demand for chicken meat anywhere in the early twentieth century.
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Kashrut restrictions on slaughtering methods meant that Jewish demand was for live chickens, and from the mid-1920s these were increasingly reared in the Delmarva peninsula, between the Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic Ocean. 3 While chicken production there in the 1930s grew, the industry remained small overall. It wasn't until Jewish demand could be met with pre-slaughtered chicken that the scale of chicken production was transformed; the first processing stations opening in 16 It was a seasonal activity, with hens laying in the lighter summer months, and so could only ever be a sideline to the main farm business. Egg laying was mostly managed by the farmers' wives, with its significance deprecated as merely her "pocket money" activity.
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Significant or not, an egg-producing industry needed chickens, for a hen's productive life lasted around two years. And while there were some small commercial hatcheries, most egg-laying flocks reproduced themselves. This inevitably led to the production of surplus cockerel chicks all around the country. It was these young cockerel chicks (males) that supplied the early demand for small "roasters". The older "spent", or redundant, layers were mostly only fit for the pot. 18 Apart from some imports from chicken farms in Hungary, Lithuania and Russia, the chicken supplied to British households in the 1940s was overwhelmingly a by-product of these egg-laying flocks. 19 They were mostly sold in local markets or through small, independent egg and poultry retailers. But demand was growing in the 1940s and 1950s. For one thing, chicken was left off the postwar British rationing system, and so a genuine market emerged. A few regional grocery chains that had sold poultry before the war also Secondly, British food retailing, and poultry retailing in particular, was seemingly far more concentrated than the United States, enabling a few leading retailers to exert more control over the emerging industry than was the case in the U.S. This needs some explanation, for while there were many thousands of small, independent poultry stores in Britain in the 1930s, the trade "disappeared" during the war. 22 By the early 1950s only a dozen or so chains dominated the re-emerging trade. The Unilever subsidiary MacFisheries and the regional grocer J. Sainsbury were the most important by far. 23 With the continued uncertainty over import restrictions in the postwar years, and the expected growth in consumer demand for chicken, these leading retailers wanted to encourage greater quantity and better quality from domestic suppliers.
Sainsbury's had already invested in its British supply lines with a longstanding trading relationship with Lloyd Maunder, a meat supplier based in Tiverton, Devon, and had even established its own poultry farm and processing plants in East Anglia.
Sainsbury wanted to extend such collaborative supply arrangements to other leading poultry producers.
24
.
9
It wasn't that American food retailers ignored chicken producers. Horowitz mentions the East Coast retailer A&P as one retailer that was involved with the Delmarva producers, for example. 25 But the leading retailers in Britain were able to exercise far more influence over their supply lines because they handled proportionately a much greater share of the total poultry trade. Sainsbury's, the market leader, reckoned on having around fifteen percent of the total market. With far more stores than Sainsbury's, MacFisheries could not have been far behind. Add in several of the other strong regional grocers, and the nascent poultry industry was dominated by perhaps less than a dozen retailers.
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Retailers were therefore able to exert far more control over the industry than in the United States, and it was these retailers, not the Ministry of Agriculture (the British equivalent of the USDA), who pressed British poultry farmers to follow American methods, exploit economies of scale and so drive down the price of chicken. The net result was that British retailers not only possessed more market power than their
American counterparts, but they did not have to compete with an assertive state agency in efforts to restructure and co-ordinate poultry production. They nevertheless shared a similar goal to the USDA, wanting to create a mass market for chicken. In
Britain this proved problematic, for despite its privileged position off the meat ration, chicken in Britain was firmly identified as a luxury in the mid-1950s, and it came with a price to match.
IV. Self-service-inspired retailer intervention in British Poultry production
10
The consensus view in the early 1950s was that chicken remained too expensive in Retailers then began to reduce their range of offerings to just three grades of chicken:
small chickens (very young birds at 1lb to 1½lb weight), roasters (up to 3lb and selling at the 10s price point) and boilers. 28 "Standardization is long overdue", claimed Poultry Farmer in late 1954 "and until we have got some common basis on which to compare one bird with another, the whole business of buying table poultry is quite a hazard." Retailers pressed for far more uniformity, especially in the popular 3lb category.
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As retailers began to influence both the size and permitted rearing costs, so pressure was increasingly brought to bear on the palatability and presentation of the chicken meat. Alan Sainsbury (Executive Director and Chairman of the family firm) insisted on buying white-fleshed birds, claiming that (and in contrast to prevailing tastes in the U.S.) "yellow-fleshed birds are not popular" with consumers. "Put yellow and whitefleshed birds side by side and you can be sure the yellow will be left to the last."
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Sainsbury also became active in breed selection, collaborating with commercial hatcheries and sponsoring the competitions in the first official broiler tests in 1959.
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Retailers also dropped the word "broiler". It had been imported from the United States along with the industry, but British cooking habits didn't include broiling. The term merely confused British shoppers; it was too close to the word "boiler", the lower quality fowls.
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These few retailers were so interventionist because it was they who were at the forefront of adopting the self-service format during these years, and none more so industry. 40 The company was appealing for producers capable of producing batches of not less than 5,000 birds at a time. It was a far cry from traditional poultry farming and those flocks of 200 to 400 birds.
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The self-service imperative for off-site evisceration inevitably therefore led to increased capital intensity, specifically in refrigeration. And not just in processing stations. All the way along the supply chain from slaughtering to sale, eviscerated poultry needed to be kept cold. "The temperature… must be reduced quickly to below zero Fahrenheit and held at this until a few hours before the bird is put into the oven.
This means some formidable problems for distribution and the expense of such distribution must be charged to the product. Much so-called quick frozen poultry is badly trussed, low frozen and just pushed into a cellulose film bag, and after a few . 15 days' handling the bag bursts and the bird then begins to develop freezer burn, which means the flavour is lost" explained Poultry Farmer in 1958.
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The demand for refrigeration units in trucks and vans grew, with Imperial Chemical Industries emerging as the country's leading supplier. 43 The need for refrigeration at the point of sale of course became paramount, and so an unintended consequence of the self-service format's imperative need to push non-display activities up the supply chain was to give those retailers with large existing investments in expensive refrigeration units a strong competitive advantage in selling chicken. 44 Indeed, even among the supermarket pioneers only Sainsbury's, MacFisheries and the much smaller Waitrose had made the necessary investments. By the mid-1950s Sainsbury typically installed up to two dozen refrigerators in each of its new self-service stores.
Its Chief Electrical Engineer reported that, "Some idea of the load required at
Lewisham can be given by the fact that it is practically double that required by the Lewisham Gaumont Cinema and had our building not been well advanced, the
[electricity] supply company would have insisted on the construction of a sub-station to take this load." MacFisheries was also rolling out refrigeration-intensive, selfservice format stores across the north of England. 
V. Retailer as Industry Co-ordinator
The net effect of continual innovation in the British poultry industry in the ten years after the decontrol of feedstuffs was of a technological revolution in intensive rearing methods among farmers, the adoption of factory processing at packing stations and the creation of a market for a slightly different product than in the U.S. -the frozen chicken. These retailer-led influences were to have a dramatic impact on the speed with which the poultry industry developed in Britain and the organisational structure it adopted. The reduction in the size of the bird from a 4½lb to 5lb bird to a 3lb bird reduced the growing cycle from 12 to 10 weeks (and with later improvements in feedstuffs to nine weeks), meaning farmers were able to move from three harvests per year to four, and then to five. The productivity of farm space rocketed.
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But it was the remarkable increase in the capital intensity in processing that forced the leading firms to invest heavily or lose out. Processors increasingly contracted out chicken rearing itself. Despite such precipitate change in firms like Buxted Chickens .
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and Lloyd Maunder, investments followed a careful sequence of discussion and agreement with the leading retailers.
While retailers were eager to consult with producers on product quality and price, they were quickly dragged into the industry's re-organisation because of one important consequence of the drive to expand rearing. As the economies of scale began to be exploited and flock sizes rose from the hundreds to the thousands, so retailers became increasingly agitated over fluctuations in supply. In the United
States as the industry spread, it was plagued by periods of glut, before price falls subsequently led to producers exiting and so to undersupply. Such volatility hampered the industry's ability to market the product. 49 But the much smaller number of retailers in Britain exerted far more control over the supply chain than was possible in the United States to co-ordinate production cycles. They needed to, because they depended on "regularity in supplies,… steady prices to the consumer… [and] consistency in quality", claimed Sainsbury's Max Justice in his keynote to the inaugural broiler conference.
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However, volatility in supply was difficult to eradicate because of the increase in batch size as chicken flocks grew. With the early producers rearing a flock of, say, 1,000 or more chickens over a 10 to 12 week season, the aim was to slaughter and distribute the entire flock of chickens as soon as they reached the target weight. The costs of two or three additional days of feeding could eliminate the farmers' profit margin. As flock sizes increased into the tens of thousands, the risks multiplied. So the leading growers began to contract directly with supermarket retailers in advance of the chickens even hatching, in order to reduce the risk of too many flocks being .
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brought to market simultaneously. 51 In 1958 according to Poultry Farmer and Packer, "the chief development… has been the rise of the 'group system'", where farmers had fixed contracts with packing stations, which in turn had fixed contracts with retailers, enabling the market to be co-ordinated.
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Leading retailers precipitated the development of the contract raising system, in particular Sainsbury. Alan Sainsbury had been very involved in the wartime controls of food production and distribution, which revolved around the zoning of supply, eliminating competition, but enforcing co-operative behaviour. They sought to adapt wartime practices for the fully competitive markets of the mid-1950s. John Maunder recalled being summoned to Max Justice's office in London in 1956 along with a few other pioneer poultry processors, and told by the Sainsbury representative that "we're going to organise the country into sectors. And Maunder, you can have the West Country, and Antony Fisher you can have the South-east,… And we just sat there and took this as our marching orders. We were basically told, and 'Go home and organise it.' We had nothing more than that to go on. We literally had to go back and organise it." 53 Maunder, Buxted and the others then recruited farmers to supply them, and they in turn then had the processors as guaranteed outlets. It was not straightforward, but the "group system" spread.
John Maunder later recollected that "you had to go out and literally persuade farmers to invest in chicken houses, at a time when it was a relatively unknown and unproven thing. It gathered momentum, of course, in a matter of a strikingly short period of .
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time -only a couple of years. Farmers talked amongst themselves and we virtually had to do very little selling of the idea because it was an attractive commercial proposition at that time. In those early stages it was very novel. And to get a farmer to actually understand the fact that he had to put these day-old chicks in when we wanted them put in, because it had to be on a programmed output." 54 The system guaranteed revenues to its privileged insiders, which in turn facilitated their commitment to a very high level of capital expenditure in what were still quite small firms. Buxted worked very closely with Sainsbury's as it embarked on its major expansion of processing facilities, for example. Perhaps unsurprisingly, "Sainsbury's became by far their biggest and best customer." 55 The lead-suppliers collaborated among themselves, facing little incentive to compete once inside the Sainsbury "sector system", sharing knowledge about how to obtain the best supplies. 56 It was a system that constrained competitive forces, and so indeed privileged insiders, but at the enormous benefit of increasing the returns to investment in new facilities, in what was inevitably a highly volatile trade. 57 It was a form of collaboration that echoes contemporaneous developments in the U.S., but which remained significantly different. For there it was farmers and feed companies, prompted by the USDA, that integrated forwards. Retailers, and initially processors, were omitted from the standard integrated U.S. poultry business. Processors indeed continued to buy their meat at auctions until recently, prompting incredulity from their British colleagues.
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In Britain, as the scale of rearing and processing increased, and as the quality or product was increasingly assured, so did incentives to firms to incorporate multiple "From the stage of hatching-egg production to processing, the cost of this chain of enterprises exceeds £1½ million. The organisation behind the achievement of putting a chicken weighing 2½ lb ready-to-cook in the shops at 7/6d to 10/-". 60 Well before then, by the end of 1958, the British poultry industry was claiming to have reached the American industry at the technological frontier of poultry production, in terms of both the rate of growth and the efficiency of processing.
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Maunder and his fellow integrated processors would "all… make fairly regular trips to the States. The realization that we all came to was that in fact the only benefit that they [the U.S. producers] brought to this whole scene was the genetic benefit. We rapidly overtook them in almost every other sphere, and we would go there and we would say 'Yes, very interesting, but…' In most areas they were behind us… So we were always interested in what they we doing, but if we were interested in anything at all, it was the genetic progress that they were making with the stock." 62 .
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The growth in the poultry industry in the decade or so after the decontrol of feedstuffs was truly impressive. Total commercial broiler chicken production grew from a near insignificant one million in 1950, to five million by 1953, or perhaps one-eighth of the egg-laying population. But after the summer of 1953 growth was truly remarkable, the 63 This explosive growth in the size of the chicken industry was associated with no less a dramatic concentration, with, by 1963, 90 percent of the entire chicken production "in the hands of only 1,000 growers", each either owned by, or contracting with only a few dozen processors. 64 At the top of the industry were Sainsbury's and MacFisheries in retailing, and Buxted and Lloyd Maunder in production and processing. Together these firms had captured around one third of the total market during the late 1950s and early 1960s, albeit at different stages. 65 Such concentration had yielded tremendous gains in efficiency, which allowed the price to fall. 66 In 1954 Sainsbury's were selling their roasters for 4s per lb or more, which for a 4lb bird placed a chicken firmly in the luxury price category. 67 Hall and It was the co-ordinating role played by a few leading food retailers that enabled efficiency levels to rise so quickly in the British industry. Sainsbury was committed to introducing self-service techniques into its chain of stores from the late 1950s, while still retaining its traditional commitment to poultry. It was only after realizing the possibilities that arose from introducing American methods in processing that Sainsbury's then organised the industry by allocating regional sectors to its privileged suppliers, who then had to go ensure supplies came from their local farmers. This, the "group system", was an echo of wartime practice and yet it was superbly successful in peacetime competitive markets because it allowed the British industry to avoid the volatility associated with the U.S. model. The lack of co-ordination there meant that the market for chicken initially oscillated between periods of glut and scarcity before consolidation occurred. Instead, in Britain, the market was created for frozen, not fresh, chicken, so perishability was reduced. Co-ordination around this frozen chicken enabled a stable market to be created very early. Revenues then became far more predictable, so prompting higher rates of investment in advanced mechanisation, and, with the guaranteed sales, high rates of utilisation across all new capital equipment from the outset. It provided an institutional structure that enabled scarce investment to be used very efficiently, and so encouraged rapid growth.
The British model was based on collaborative relationships along the supply chain instigated and controlled by retailers. This was absent in the U.S. The American .
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preference for "arm's length" contracts even to the 1980s bemused John Maunder. In a sector where quality assurance was of paramount importance in guaranteeing product quality to the consumers, the British model was to opt for the organisation closest to consumers, the leading retailers, to be the principal co-ordinator. The
American model largely left such co-ordination to the relevant Government department and the firms with the deepest pockets, best able to survive the industry's periodic downturns and drive consolidation through. In Britain, instead of the proactive role of the USDA, the Government was essentially broadly protectionist, but uninterested in pursuing any interventionist policies that might have helped to encourage modernization of poultry production. Indeed, their protectionist measures hindered innovation in the closely related egg sector, permitting archaic production and distribution methods to continue unchallenged.
The British model eventually changed, and became somewhat less integrated, although food retailers still carry far more influence there today than in the United
States. But the significance of the remarkable British poultry industry experiment was to have important repercussions for the country's leading food retailers for many years afterwards. Of all the supermarket pioneers, Sainsbury's emerged as the market leader in the early 1960s and increased its dominance during the 1980s because of the importance of learning how to innovate using such strongly collaborative relationships with its supply chain.
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